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A POLYNOMIAL TIME ALGORITHM FOR THE BRAID
DOUBLE SHIELDED PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS
VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
Abstract. We propose new provable practical deterministic polyno-
mial time algorithm for the braid Wang, Xu, Li, Lin and Wang Double
shielded public key cryptosystems [1]. We show that a linear decom-
position attack based on the decomposition method introduced by the
author in monography [2] and paper [3] works for the image of braids
under the Lawrence-Krammer representation by finding the exchanging
keys in the both two main protocols in [1].
1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss, following [2] and [3] a new practical attack on the
two main protocols proposed in [1]. This attack introduced by the author
in [2] and [3] works when the platform groups are linear. We show that in
this case, contrary to the common opinion (and some explicitly stated se-
curity assumptions), one does not need to solve the underlying algorithmic
problems to break the scheme, i.e., there is another algorithm that recovers
the private keys without solving the principal algorithmic problem on which
the security assumptions are based. This changes completely our under-
standing of security of these scheme. The efficacy of the attack depends on
the platform group, so it requires a specific analysis in each particular case.
In general one can only state that the attack is in polynomial time in the
size of the data, when the platform and related groups are given together
with their linear representations. In many other cases we can effectively use
known linear presentations of the groups under consideration. The braid
groups are among them in view of the Lawrence-Krammer representation.
The monography [2] solves uniformly protocols based on the conjugacy
search problem (Ko, Lee et. al. [4], Wang, Cao et. al [5]), protocols based on
the decomposition and factorization problems (Stickel [6], Alvares, Martinez
et. al. [7], Shpilrain, Ushakov [8], Romanczuk, Ustimenko [9]), protocols
based on actions by automorphisms (Mahalanobis [10], Habeeb, Kahrobaei
et. al. [11], Markov, Mikhalev et. al. [12]), and a number of other protocols.
In this paper we apply our method to the double shielded key exchange
protocols 1 and 2 proposed in [1].
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2. Constructing a basis
This section is a part of (still unpublished) paper of the author and A.G.
Miasnikov.
Let V be a finite dimensional vector space over a field F with basis
B = {v1, . . . , vr}. Let End(V ) be the semigroup of endomorphisms of V. We
assume that elements v ∈ V are given as vectors relative to B, and endomor-
phisms a ∈ End(V ) are given by their matrices relative to B. Let < W >
denotes submonoid generated by W. For an endomorphism a ∈ End(V ) and
an element v ∈ V we denote by va the image of v under a. Also, for any
subsets W ⊆ V and A ⊆ End(V ) we put WA = {wa|w ∈ W,a ∈ A}, and
denote by Sp(W ) the subspace of V generated by W . We assume that ele-
ments of the field F are given in some constructive form and the ”size” of
the form is defined. Furthermore, we assume that the basic field operations
in F are efficient, in particular they can be performed in polynomial time
in the size of the elements. In all the particular protocols considered in this
paper the field F satisfies all these conditions.
There is an algorithm that for given finite subsets W ⊆ V and U ⊆
End(V ) finds a basis of the subspace Sp(W 〈U〉) in the form wa11 , . . . , w
at
t ,
where wi ∈ W and ai is a product of elements from U . Furthermore, the
number of field operations used by the algorithm is polynomial in r = dimF V
and the cardinalities of W and U .
Using Gauss elimination one can effectively find a maximal linearly in-
dependent subset L0 of W . Notice that Sp(L
〈U〉
0 ) = Sp(W
〈U〉). Adding to
the set L0 one by one elements v
a, where v ∈ L0, a ∈ U and checking every
time linear independence of the extended set, one can effectively construct
a maximal linearly independent subset L1 of the set L0 ∪L
U
0 which extends
the set L0. Notice that Sp(L
〈U〉
0 ) = Sp(L
〈U〉
1 ) and the elements in L1 are of
the form wa, where w ∈ W and a = 1 or a ∈ U . It follows that if L0 = L1
then L0 is a basis of Sp(W
〈U〉). If L0 6= L1 then we repeat the procedure for
L1 and find a maximal linearly independent subset L2 of L1 ∪L
U
1 extending
L1. Keep going one constructs a sequence of strictly increasing subspaces
L0 < L1 < . . . < Li of V . Since the dimension r of V is finite the sequence
stabilizes for some i ≤ r. In this case Li is a basis of Sp(W
〈U〉) and its
elements are in the required form.
To estimate the upper bound of the number of the field operations used by
the algorithm, observe first that the number of the field operations in Gauss
elimination performed on a matrix of size n× r is O(n2r). Hence it requires
at most O(n2r) steps to construct L0 fromW , where n = |W | is the number
of elements in W . Notice that |Lj | ≤ r for every j. So to find L + j + 1 it
suffices to perform Gauss elimination on the matrix corresponding to Lj∪L
U
j
which has size at most r + r|U |.Thus the upper estimate on this number is
O(r3|U |2). Since there are at most r iterations of this procedure one has the
total estimate as O(r3|U |2 + r|W |2).
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In this paper V is underlying linear space of a matrix algebra Matt(F) of
all matrices of size t × t over F. Let G be a subgroup of the multiplicative
group of Matt(F), and A and B are two subgroups of G. Every pair of
elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B define an automorphism ϕa,b of V such that for
every v ∈ V one has vϕa,b = avb. Let U be submonoid generated by all such
automorphisms. Thus for every subset W ⊆ V one can effectively construct
a basis of subspace WU .
3. The double shielded key exchange protocol 1 [1]
.
In view of the Lawrence-Krammer representation of the braid group Bn
we can assume that the group G below is given as a linear group over a field
F. So, we assume that G is a part of a finite dimensional vector space V.
At first we describe the protocol 1.
• Alice and Bob agree on a nonabelian group G, and randomly chosen
element h ∈ G and two subgroups A,B of G, such that ab = ba for
any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B. We assume that A and B are finitely
generated and are given by the fixed generating sets {a1, ..., an} and
{b1, ..., bm}, respectively.
• Alice chooses four elements c1, c2, d1, d2 ∈ A, computes x = d1c1hc2d2,
and then sends x to Bob.
• Bob chooses six elements f1, f2, g1, g2, g3, g4 ∈ B, computes y =
g1f1hf2g2 and w = g3f1xf2g4, and then sends (y,w) to Alice.
• Alice chooses two elements d3, d4 ∈ A, computes z = d3c1yc2d4 and
u = d−11 wd
−1
2 , and then sends (z, u) to Bob.
• Bob sends v = g−11 zg
−1
2 to Alice.
• Alice computes KA = d
−1
3 vd
−1
4 .
• Bob computes KB = g
−1
3 ug
−1
4 = c1f1hf2c2 which is equal to KA and
then K = KA = KB is Alice and Bob’s common secret key.
Now we show how the common secret key can be computed.
Let BzB be subspace of V generated by all elements of the form fzg
where f, g ∈ B. We can construct a basis {eizli(ei, li ∈ B, i = 1, ..., r)} of
BzB in a polynomial time as it is explained in the previous section. Since
v ∈ BzB, we can effectively write it in the form
(1) v =
r∑
i=1
αieizli,
where αi ∈ F, i = 1, ..., r.
In a similar way we construct bases {e′jhl
′
j(e
′
j , l
′
j ∈ B, j = 1, ..., s)} of BhB,
and {e′′kwl
′′
k(e
′′
k, l
′′
k ∈ B, k = 1, ..., q)} of BwB. Then we get presentations
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(2) y =
s∑
j=1
βje
′
jhl
′
j ,
where βj ∈ F, j = 1, ..., s,
and
(3) x =
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kwl
′′
k ,
where γk ∈ F, k = 1, ..., q.
Now we swap w by u in the right hand side of (3). By direct computation
we obtain
(4)
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kul
′′
k =
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kd
−1
1 wd
−1
2 l
′′
k = d
−1
1 (
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kwl
′′
k)d
−1
2 = d
−1
1 xd
−1
2 = c1hc2.
Then we swap h by c1hc2 in the right hand side of (2).
(5)
s∑
j=1
βjf
′′
j c1hc2g
′′
j = c1(
s∑
j=1
βje
′
jhl
′
j)c2 = c1yc2 = c1g1f1hf2g2c2.
At last we swap z by c1g1f1hf2g2c2 in the right hand side of (1) and get
(6)
r∑
i=1
αieic1g1f1hf2g2c2li = d
−1
3 (
r∑
i=1
αieizli)d
−1
4 = c1f1hf2c2 = K.
4. The double shielded key exchange protocol 2 [1]
.
As before we assume that the group G below is given as a linear group
over a field F. So, we assume that G is a part of a finite dimensional vector
space V.
Firstly we describe the protocol 2.
• Alice and Bob agree on a nonabelian group G, and randomly chosen
element h ∈ G and two subgroups A,B of G, such that ab = ba for
any a ∈ A and any b ∈ B. We assume that A and B are finitely
generated and are given by the fixed generating sets {a1, ..., an} and
{b1, ..., bm}, respectively.
• Alice chooses four elements c1, d1 ∈ A and f2, g2 ∈ B, computes
x = d1f1hf2g2, and then sends x to Bob.
• Bob chooses six elements c2, d2, d3 ∈ A and f1, g1, g3 ∈ B, computes
y = g1f1hc2d2 and w = g3f1xc2d3, and then sends (y,w) to Alice.
• Alice chooses two elements d4 ∈ A and g4 ∈ B, computes z =
d4c1yf2g4 and u = d
−1
1 wg
−1
2 , and then sends (z, u) to Bob.
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• Bob sends v = g−11 zd
−1
2 to Alice.
• Alice computes KA = d
−1
4 vg
−1
4 .
• Bob computes KB = g
−1
3 ud
−1
3 = c1f1hf2c2 which is equal to KA and
then K = KA = KB is Alice and Bob’s common secret key.
Now we show how the common secret key can be computed.
Let BzA be subspace of V generated by all elements of the form fzd where
f ∈ B, d ∈ A. We can construct a basis {eizli(ei ∈ B, li ∈ A, i = 1, ..., r)} of
BzA in a polynomial time as it is explained in the previous section. Since
v ∈ BzA, we can effectively write
(7) v =
r∑
i=1
αieizli,
where αi ∈ F, i = 1, ..., r.
In a similar way we construct bases {e′jhl
′
j(e
′
j ∈ B, l
′
j ∈ A, j = 1, ..., s)} of
BhA, and {e′′kwl
′′
k(e
′′
k ∈ B, l
′′
k ∈ A, k = 1, ..., q)} of BwA. Then we write
(8) y =
s∑
j=1
βje
′
jhl
′
j ,
where βj ∈ F, j = 1, ..., s,
and
(9) x =
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kwl
′′
k ,
where γk ∈ F, k = 1, ..., q.
Now we swap w by u in the right hand side of (3). By direct computation
we obtain
(10)
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kul
′′
k =
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kd
−1
1 wg
−1
2 l
′′
k = d
−1
1 (
q∑
k=1
γke
′′
kwl
′′
k)g
−1
2 = d
−1
1 xg
−1
2 = c1hf2.
Then we swap h by c1hf2 in the right hand side of (2).
(11)
s∑
j=1
βje
′
jc1hf2l
′
j = c1(
s∑
j=1
βje
′
jhl
′
j)f2 = c1yf2 = c1g1f1hc2d2f2.
At last we swap z by c1g1f1hc2d2f2 in the right hand side of (1) and get
(12)
r∑
i=1
αieic1g1f1hc2d2f2li = d
−1
4 (
r∑
i=1
αieizli)g
−1
4 = d
−1
4 vg
−1
4 = c1f1hc2f2 = K.
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Two other, the shielded public key encryption protocol and the shield
digital signature protocol in [1] completely based on the protocols 1 and 2.
5. The Lawrence-Krammer Representation
Let Bn denote the Artin braid group on n strings, n ∈ N. R. Lawrence
described in 1990 a family of so called Lawrence representations of Bn.
Around 2001 S. Bigelow [13] and D. Krammer [14] independently proved
that all braid groups Bn are linear. Their work used the Lawrence-Krammer
representations ρn : Bn → GLn(n−1)/2(Z[t
±1, s±1]) that has been proved
faithful for every n ∈ N. One can effectively find the image ρn(g) for every
element g ∈ Bn. Moreover, there exists an effective procedure to recover a
braid g ∈ Bn from its image ρn(g). It was shown in [15] that it can be done
in O(2m3logdt) multiplications of entries in ρn(g). Here m = n(n−1)/2 and
dt is a parameter that can be effectively computed by ρn(g). See [15] for
details.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a polynomial time deterministic algorithm to
recover secret keys established by the protocols 1 and 2 in [1]. We assumed
that the group G in this protocols is linear.
The authors of [1] suggested that the infinite nonabelian groups Bn with
n ≥ 12 can be taken as the platform groups for the protocols 1 and 2 in the
above section 2. By the Lawrence-Krammer representations the groups Bn
are linear. Moreover, this representations are effective computable and in-
vertible. Unfortunately, in this setting the proposed protocols are not secure.
Our cryptanalysis in the above section 2 shows that the linear decomposition
attack works effectively in this case.
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